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Abstract
The aim of this paper was to analyse the effects of secure land tenure contracts on agricultural productivity. These effects will be highlighted through
investment. Data from the third Cameroonian household survey (ECAM III) was used to estimate a binary choice model and productivity equation by
instrumental variables. Firstly, the results suggest that there is a moral hazard in the investment behaviour of sharecroppers. This result could support
the hypothesis of a holdup problem, which would reduce the incentives for agricultural households to make optimal investments. Secondly, the insecurity
of land tenure contract would reduce the probability of purchasing modern equipment by about 0.44 and reduce the probability of using fertilizer by
about 0.21. However, these investments determine the differences in term of productivity among agricultural household. Thus, the sharecroppers are less
productive because they invest less than landlords. Therefore, it seems necessary to implement institutional mechanisms that can help to release the
constraints on land access and to ensure the respect for rights and obligations between all the actors involved in agricultural leases.
Key words: Security of land tenure contracts, moral hazard, sharecroppers, holdup.
Introduction
Agriculture remains the engine for economic growth in Cameroon.
With a contribution around 25-30% of gross domestic product
(GDP), the agricultural sector employs about 50% of the active
population 10. The sector’s contribution to national wealth has
remained consistent. In 2006, agriculture contributed up to 55%
of exports, a significant part of the foreign exchange resources of
the country 18. However,  the recent food crisis in 2008, which was
characterised by simultaneous and sudden rise of prices, shows
the fragility of productive system, which is unable to follow the
evolution of domestic demand.
Indeed, even though the country has significant natural
resources such as the arable land, access to this land seems to be
an additional burden on agricultural households. Only 17% of
irrigable land is used and 26% of arable land is cultivated in
Cameroon 20. In addition, conflicts and land pressures accentuate
agricultural households tenure insecurity in Cameroon 17. The
majority of Cameroonians, especially those in rural areas, appear
as simple “squatters” on their own land 2. Only 150,000 land titles
have been issued since 1974, while an estimated potential is about
3,000,000 4. Only 5% of those who have title their land were
peasants. Also land titles issued are often questioned for
irregularities while we can observe that many land titles are
sometimes delivered to different owners for the same parcel. This
land ownership plunges households in a situation of uncertainty
and tenure insecurity. In one hand, the confusion created by the
multiplicity of legal norms emphasises land disputes between
indigenous and non-indigenous. On the other hand, the dispute
between the state and rural communities may occur 17. The
challenge is, thus, to ensure an optimal allocation of agricultural
land and security on land tenure contract for farmers. Moreover,
for many agricultural households who do not have arable land,
the conclusion of land tenure contracts is often the only way of
access to land, implying an agency relationship between land
owners (principal) and those who exploit (agent).
In Cameroon, population pressures combined with the high
rate of urbanisation generate competitions for land that undermine
the security of contracts as long as owners are tempted to
renegotiate these contracts for beneficed new profit opportunities.
Such threat could negatively affect investment and productivity
of agricultural households. Insofar as the incompletes contracts +
may lead farmers to make sub-optimal investment level due to the
risk of crowding out on their parcel 13. One may thus wonder if
there is a relationship between the security of land tenure contract,
productivity and agricultural investment.
The empirical literature on the effects of land contracts on
agricultural investment and productivity is abundant. Insofar as
agricultural investments are specific assets, the choice of making
such investments largely depends on the land tenant insurance
on the sustainability of his contract. Then, Jacoby and Mansuri 13
+ A contract is said to be incomplete if it is impossible for one part to anticipate various contingencies that
may affect the terms of this contract, to write the terms of this contract and to enforce them.
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show that, as long as the landlord cannot commit in the credible
way to the sustainability of the contract, specific investments are
non-optimal. Additionally, these investments are reduced as long
as the risk of crowding increase and also the insecurity on land
tenure contract increases. The contractual instability generated
by the uncertainty over the renewal of the contract can lead to a
moral hazard that would reduce investment of tenant. The authors
add that such instability is inherent in the nature of this kind of
contracts and affects both the tenancy and sharecropping.
On the other hand, Banerjee and Ghatak 7 have constructed a
model to formalise the contractual relationship between a landlord
and a tenant. The authors consider that the termination of tenure
contract can be used as an incentive mechanism. Indeed, the
landlord will use the threat of a termination of contract to force the
tenant to make optimal choices, which can ensure to avoidance of
this eventuality. Under certain conditions, it appears that the risk
of crowding may even lead to an improvement in the productivity
of the tenant. The situation is similar to a repeated game between
a principal and an agent. In addition, the principal has the ability
to punish the agent in the event of inappropriate behaviour. Kassie
and Holden 15 showed that if the productivity of the farmer could
assure the contract renewal, tenure security is necessary to ensure
that farmers make optimal investments.
The implications of the type of agrarian contracts on resource
allocation have been subject to numerous investigations. The
authors tried to highlight the existence of Marshallian inefficiency
and instability effects of different type of contract. Laffont and
Matoussi 16 found that sharecropper provides less effort than
landlord and their productivity is therefore significantly lower.
For Acharya 1, sharecropper and tenant intensively use less inputs
than landlord.
Banerjee et al. 7 explicitly addressed the security of land tenure
contracts and stability of tenure. The authors conducted a quasi-
experimental study in eastern Bengal. Following a land reform,
which aimed to increase the bargaining power of tenant, the
authors tried to evaluate the consequences on the farmer’s
efficiency. The results indicate an increase in productivity of
sharecropper; this appears as the result of the increase of their
bargaining power.
Jacoby and Mansuri 13 were interested in the specific
investments made by households in different type of land tenure
contractual in Pakistan. The authors highlighted the problem of
holdup. Indeed, they showed that investments in organic fertilizers
are lower for sharecropper parcel than for landlord parcel.
Moreover, Gavian and Fafchamps 11 in a case of Niger also achieved
similar results. Jacoby and Rozelle 14 showed that the insecurity
of agrarian contracts, which is associated with high risk of
expropriation reduces investment in organic fertilizers in China.
The authors also found that, to ensure the security of tenure
would lead to substantial economic efficiency gains. Arcand et
al. 3 in the case of Tunisia have also found that the type of land
tenure contract was an important determinant of the efficiency
allocation of inputs.
Deininger and Jin 9 led to the same conclusions and confirmed
the hypothesis of Marshallian inefficiency in Ethiopia. The authors
also established that land tenure insecurity explains the suboptimal
behaviour of tenant. Bandiera 5 observed that the growing of
trees and regular harvest are certainly expensive but help to
maintain soil fertility and reduce soil erosion. There is some kind
of gain that is not wholly owned by the tenant. Additionally, the
lands used by the landlord are more likely to have maintained
trees. Thus, the Marshallian inefficiency as well as the insecurity
of agrarian contracts seems to affect the behaviour and
performance of agricultural households.
The aim of this paper was to analyse the effects of incomplete
contracts on agricultural investment and productivity in the case
of agricultural households in Cameroon. Using data from the third
Cameroonian household survey in 2007 (ECAM III), we estimated
a binary choice model and productivity equation by instrumental
variables.
Materials and Methods
The data: The data use for this study are from the third
Cameroonian household survey in 2007 (ECAM III) by the National
Institute of Statistics. Of the 1645 agricultural households in the
sample, 1428 are landlords and 217 are sharecroppers. The sample
covers six regions that make up the study area such as the Centre,
Littoral, extreme-North, West, South-West and North-West. The
choice of these regions can be justified by the fact that the mean
of population density of each region are higher than the national
mean. In addition, the agricultural household is the unit of analysis.
The model: In this paper, the effects of the incompleteness of
land tenure contracts will be highlighted by comparing the
behaviour of landlords and sharecroppers same as in the study of
Jacoby and Mansuri 13. The estimation strategy will require two
steps. In the first step, a binary choice model will be estimated in
order to assess the relationship between investment decisions
and the type of land tenure contract to identify a potential moral
hazard associated with insecure land tenure contracts 9, 11, 13.
In the first step, the investment equation is given as follows:
I
ij 
= αC
i 
+ βX
i 
+ δ + ε
i 
                                                                            (1)
where I
ij
 refers to investment i made by household j. Two types of
investment are retained (modern equipment and soil improvement).
C
i
 represents the type of household (landlord or sharecropper), X
i
is a vector of household characteristics and land they operate, ε
i
-
is a random disturbance, α and β are parameters to be estimated,
δ is the constant.
Note that the parameter α captures the moral hazard and
measures its effect on investment. The introduction of the feature
vector X
i
, which represents the control variables, helps to solve
the problem of unobserved heterogeneity household.
In the second step, a productivity equation was estimated using
the technique of instrumental variables. The fitted values of
investments were introduced in the second equation in order to
link agricultural productivity and investment. This second equation
is specified as follows:
Y
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= θ
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+ θ
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Q
i 
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2
Z
i 
+ θ
3
Î
ij 
 + η
i
                                                                (2)
where Y
i
 denotes productivity, Q
i
 is other inputs used in the
production process, Z
i 
is the characteristics of households and
their parcel that can influence productivity and Î
ij
 the fitted value
of investment i, η
i 
is a random disturbance with the usual
assumptions.
Furthermore, although the two-stage least squares would result
in consistent estimators, this procedure does not take into account
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all the information provided by the different equations in the model.
So the joint estimation procedures lead generally to more efficient
estimators 8. For the instrumental variables, we used the
Conditional Mixed Process (CMP) according to Roodman 19, which
takes into account all the information available in each equation.
Results
The choice of a joint estimation procedure is justified since it is
observed that there is a significant correlation between the
residuals of the two equations. The one-step estimation procedure
would lead to biased results because atanhrho_12 statistics and
atanhrho_13, atanhrho_23 are significantly non-zero at the 5% .
Security of land tenure contracts and investment: The results of
the investment equation show a negative effect of sharecropping
contract on the probability of making investments in terms of
modern equipment and soil improvement (Table 1).
There is, therefore, a moral hazard in the investment behaviour
of sharecroppers. This result supports the hypothesis of a holdup
problem that would reduce the incentives for agricultural
households to make optimal investments. Indeed the holdup is
due to the risk for sharecropper to be crowd out by the landlord,
which can lead to relatively low levels of productivity. Additionally
land tenure contracts insecurity caused by the risk of non-renewal
of the lease would lead to moral 12.
In Cameroon, the holdup assumption could be explained by the
fact that landowners can renegotiate their contract when the value
of land increase in order to maximise their profit, which will in turn
result in a potential insecurity of land tenure contracts. Also the
lack of land market can explain this insecurity. In fact, the existence
of land market could increase the mobility of farmers and reduce
the insecurity. Then, the analysis of the maginal effects suggest
that the insecurity of land tenure contracts led to reduced
probability of acquiring modern equipment to 0.44 and the
probability of using fertilizer to 0.21 (Table 2 and 3).
In addition, education has no effect on the decision to acquire
the modern equipment, but the more educated have a greater
propensity to use fertilizer to improve soil quality. When the head
of agricultural household is the man, the propensity to invest is
greater than when it is the women. The landlords of bigger farms
invest more and use more fertilizer than those with small farms.
This result can be explained by the fact that large size farmers,
unlike the smaller size farmers are guided by profit maximisation
and production is primarily for selling.
The regional specificities suggest that agricultural households
from littoral, South-West and North-West invest more in acquiring
modern equipment than those from the centre region. Also, the
agricultural households from North-West, West and extreme-
North have a higher propensity to use fertilizers than their
counterparts from centre region. This last result can be justified
by the relative scarcity of arable land in these regions compared
to the centre region, requiring intensification in land use and
therefore the use of chemical fertilizers to increase yields. However,
a further study seems to be necessary to compare farm households
from these different regions and avoid econometric problems such
as selection bias and endogeneity which could invalidate the results.
Investment and agricultural productivity: The
productivity equation suggests that the acquisition of
equipment and the use of fertilizers significantly improve
the agricultural performance (Table 4). The agricultural
households who acquire modern equipment have the
means of productivity of CFA 168,000 which is higher
than others. Similarly, agricultural households who use
fertilizer have higher productivity on average CFA 196,000
than others. Additionally, an increase of CFA 1
expenditure on input variable lead to rise in productivity
of CFA 0.71.
In the light of these results, it appears that the
productivity differences among agricultural households
are significantly determined by investment behaviour.
We can therefore, conclude that the sharecroppers are
less productive because they invest less than landlord.
This result is similar to which achieved by Laffont and
Matoussi 16 and Acharya 1. Thus, sharecroppers feel less
secured and provide less effort than landlord that could
explain the cons productive behaviour.
Table 3. Marginal effect of the probability of use fertilizer.
Variable Marginal effect Level of significance (%) 
Sharecropping -0.2143068 5 
Farm size 0.036207 1 
Primary  
Secondary  
Income  
Extreme-north 
North-west 
0.2884425 
0.4560431 
0.0007077 
0.8271175 
0.8238217 
1 
1 
5 
1 
1 
Variable Marginal effect Level of significance (%) 
Sharecropping -0.4488241 1 
1 Sexcm  0.4223627 
Farm size 0.0387598 1 
10 
1 
1 
1 
5 
1 
health  
Income  
Extreme-north 
Littoral  
South-west 
North-west  
0.1439753 
0.0010585 
-0.4208019 
0.5889426 
0.3011322 
0.4811019 
Table 2. Marginal effect of the probability of acquire
modern equipment.
 
Variable 
Modern equipment Soil improvement 
Coefficient Standard deviation Coefficient 
Standard 
deviation 
Sharecropping -0.4488241*** 0.1145146 -0.2143068** -0.2143068** 
Income 0.0010585*** 0.0002972 0.0007077** 0.0007077** 
Education     
  Primary -0.0416281 0.1035993 0.2884425*** 0.2884425*** 
  Secondary 0.0107865 0.1256422 4560431*** 4560431*** 
  Higher 0.126191 0.1280944 0.2359893 0.2359893 
Agecm 0.0014381 0.0027457 -0.0019357 -0.0019357 
Sexcm 0.4223627*** 0.0937632 0.0513987 0.0513987 
Farm size 0.0387598*** 0.0089745 0.036207*** 0.036207*** 
Health 0.1305147 0.0867621 -0.0056259 -0.0056259 
Actprinc 1390144 0.0957306 0.0931982 0.0931982 
Region     
  Extreme-north -0.4208019*** 0.1404054 0.8271175*** 0.8271175*** 
  Littoral 0.5889426*** 0.150897 0.0858542 0.0858542 
  West 0.1210372 0.1208122 1.014491*** 1.014491*** 
  South-west 0.3011322** 0.1373502 -0.2148043 -0.2148043 
  North-west 0.4811019*** 0.1423328 0.8238217*** 0.8238217*** 
Constant -1.58815*** 0.2501697 -0.916100*** -0.916100*** 
Table 1. The determinants of investment.
Note: *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. For region and education variable, the centre region and
non-education are references, respectively.
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Moreover, the household affluence and the farm size are key
determinants of the investment decisions. The inverse relationship
between farm size and land productivity is confirmed suggesting
that there is inefficiency in the use of the land.
On the other hand, the productivity differences between regions
seem to be very significant. Thus, agricultural household from
the extreme-North, West, South-West and North-West seem to be
less productive than those in the centre region. This can be mainly
due to the existence of significant distortions and market
imperfections in the input market.
Conclusions
This paper suggests the existence of significant differences in
terms of investment and thus productivity between sharecroppers
and landlords, giving special importance to the security of land
tenure contracts for agricultural households. Thus, it seems
necessary to implement institutional mechanisms and reforms in
order to alleviate the constraints on access to land and to ensure
respect for the rights and obligations between the different actors
involved in agricultural leases.
Additionally for this study, it seems to be necessary in terms of
perspectives to investigate about the phenomenon of land
grabbing and its effects on agricultural productivity in the case of
devolving countries, which are mainly concerned by the problem
of food security. Also, the problem of inequality and inequity in
land distribution, corruption in the land sector and its implications
for land investments, land market imperfections and their
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Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
deviation 
(robust) 
Z 
Statistics 
Instruments    
   EQUIP 168.3704*** 25.82026 6.52 
   AMSOL 196.411*** 68.76837 2.86 
Education    
   Primary 17.13344 12.57799 1.36 
   Secondary -28.42818 18.28318 -1.55 
   Higher 11.07871 51.96422 0.21 
Input 0.7198646*** 0.1452577 4.96 
Agecm -0.0967098 0.4981356 -0.19 
Labour 0.5643319 1.120281 0.50 
Sexcm -10.52356 14.3727 -0.73 
Farm size -19.71125*** 5.177538 -3.81 
health  19.88785 13.43488 1.48 
Actprinc 16.36167 12.34643 1.33 
Region    
   Extreme-north -99.64409*** 29.56415 -3.37 
   Littoral -46.83407 28.97975 -1.62 
   West -93.06285*** 35.10723 -2.65 
   South-west -43.39166* 24.91257 -1.74 
   North-west -165.0171*** 34.17867 -4.83 
Constant 129.6104*** 46.31271 2.80 
lnsig_1 5.374192*** 0.1286619 41.77 
atanhrho_12 -0.2843781*** 0.0849811 -3.35 
atanhrho_13 -0.5052343** 0.2187058 -2.31 
atanhrho_23 0.1872825*** 0.0573596 3.27 
sig_1 215.7654 27.76079 - 
rho_12 -0.2769522 0.0784628 - 
rho_13 -0.4662237 0.1711669 - 
rho_23 0.1851231 0.0553938 - 
Mixed-process  regression 
Log pseudolikelihood =  
-12895.947                           
Number of obs = 1645 
Wald chi2(17) = 139.87 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
rho_ij represents the coefficient of correlation between the residuals of the equation i and j. atanhrho
is the Fisher transformation of the correlation coefficient given by: atanhrho = 1/2*ln[(1+rho)]/(1-rho)].
Table 4. Results of productivity equation.
